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15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
16 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

17 VERISIGN, INC., a Delaware
18 corporation,

19 Plaintiff,

20 v.

21 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR
22 ASSIGNED NAMES AND
23 NUMBERS, a California corporation;
24 DOES 1-50,

25 Defendants.

Case No. CV 04-1292 AHM (CTx)

**DECLARATION OF SCOTT A.
HOLLENBECK IN OPPOSITION TO
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE OF
DEFENDANT INTERNET
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS**

Date: May 17, 2004
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Courtroom: 14 – Spring Street Bldg.
Hon. A. Howard Matz

[Memorandum of Points and Authorities;
Evidentiary Objections; Appendix of
Exhibits; Declarations; and [Proposed] Order
concurrently filed and lodged herewith]

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1 I, SCOTT A. HOLLENBECK, declare:
2

3 1. I know all of the following facts of my own personal knowledge and, if
4 called and sworn as a witness, would competently testify thereto.

5 2. I am the Director of Technology for VeriSign Naming and Directory
6 Services, the business unit of VeriSign, Inc. ("VeriSign") that operates VeriSign's
7 .com registry, and I have been employed with VeriSign and its predecessor operator
8 of the registry, Network Solutions, Inc., since May 1998.

9 3. As the Director of Technology, I am familiar with the structure,
10 organization, and operation of the VeriSign .com gTLD registry; the technical
11 standards governing the use of wildcards; the operation of the Site Finder service
12 offered by VeriSign; the operation of the wildcard services offered by Internet access
13 and browser providers; and the operation of the wildcard services offered by the
14 registries for other top-level domains. As part of my duties and responsibilities for
15 VeriSign, I also stay generally informed about the contents of publicly posted
16 documents on the Internet discussing Site Finder.
17

18 I. **Technical Description of Site Finder**

19 4. When a user inputs a domain name in the address line of his browser (e.g.,
20 bokkstore.com), the browser sends the Domain Name System (DNS) query to its
21 locally configured name server or "host." If the domain name contained in the query
22 is in the .com TLD, the name server sends the query to VeriSign's .com DNS zone
23 server to find the Internet Protocol ("IP") number associated with that domain name.

24 5. As operator of the .com TLD registry, VeriSign's DNS server provides an
25 authoritative response for all queries ending in .com, such as bokkstore.com.

26 6. VeriSign deployed Site Finder between September 15, 2003 and October 4,
27 2003. Before Site Finder, if the DNS server were unable to find a domain name
28

1 contained in a query (because it did not exist in the .com zone file), the DNS would
2 return a "nonexistent domain" error message. As part of the Site Finder deployment,
3 VeriSign deployed a standards compliant "wildcard" in the .com TLD zone.

4 7. The "wildcard" allows the DNS zone server to provide a uniform response
5 to queries that include domain names that do not exist in the .com TLD zone (i.e., that
6 do not appear in the list of registered domain names on the .com registry's master
7 list). With wildcards, a zone's authoritative servers produce resource records in
8 response to queries matching wildcard entries in the zone. Therefore, when an
9 authoritative server receives a query for a domain name that does not exist in that
10 zone (e.g., bokkstore.com) and the type of entry matches the type of wildcard entry in
11 the zone (e.g., *.com), the server creates a predictable response for the user.

12 8. With the deployment of Site Finder, when the .com DNS zone server is
13 unable to find a .com domain name in the zone files (because it does not exist), the
14 deployment of the wildcard allows the DNS zone server to respond with the IP
15 address of the Site Finder servers .

16 9. This first part of the Site Finder process, the "wildcard" response, operates
17 in total compliance with applicable technical standards, providing a predictable and
18 definitive response, namely the IP address of the Site Finder web site server, instead
19 of a "nonexistent domain" error, in response to queries for nonexistent domain
20 names.

21 10. In the second part of the Site Finder process, the end user is referred
22 through the wildcard to the Site Finder servers, and if the user application is a web
23 browser, the user receives the Site Finder web page response to the query. This part
24 of the process operates separate and apart from the domain name system used to
25 provide DNS resolution services, and has no effect on the DNS or on the VeriSign
26 registries. This part of the Site Finder process affects only what happens *after* a
27 request *leaves* the DNS.
28

1 11. With the Site Finder service, if the user application is a web browser, the
2 user receives a user-friendly help screen that includes not only a clear message that
3 what was entered could not be found, but also such information as: (i) alternative web
4 addresses the user may have been seeking; (ii) a search engine; and (iii) links to
5 contextually popular categories of websites the user can search. Thus, the Site Finder
6 screen provides the user with helpful information and options beyond a simple error
7 message.

8 12. VeriSign's implementation of Site Finder is more fully described in a
9 white paper which, upon launching Site Finder, VeriSign made available to the public
10 on its website, www.verisign.com. A true and correct copy of the white paper is
11 submitted concurrently as Exhibit 51.

12
13 **II. Site Finder Complied with All Applicable Internet Protocol Standards**

14 13. Domain Name System wildcards and their deployment have been a
15 standard part of the DNS specification since RFC 1034 was published in 1987.

16 14. "RFCs" are "Requests for Comments" -- memoranda addressing the
17 various protocols that facilitate the functioning of the Internet. They are written
18 under the auspices of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the principal body
19 engaged in the development of Internet standard specifications. Site Finder complies
20 with all applicable RFCs, including RFCs 1034, 1035, 2181, 2182, 2308, and 2535.

21 15. RFC 1034 specifically contemplated a wildcard service, and describes
22 both the format of wildcard resource records as they should appear in zone files and
23 the resolution algorithm to be used when wildcards are encountered.

24 16. Those specifications, specifically RFC 1034, are incorporated into
25 VeriSign's 2001 .com Registry Agreement. VeriSign's wildcard deployment was
26 fully compliant with RFC 1034.

1 **III. The Registries of Other Top-Level Domains Have Deployed a Wildcard**
2 **and Implemented or Provided a Web Page Response**

3 17. Not only do the DNS standards anticipate wildcards, but those standards
4 have actually been tested or implemented in other DNS zones. In particular, at least
5 thirteen other registries have deployed a wildcard, including the following top-level
6 domains: .cc, .cn, .cx, .mp, .museum, .nu, .ph, .pw, .td, .tk, .tv, .tw, and .ws. A
7 majority of these provide a Site Finder type web page response.

8 18. Other registries have tested a wildcard including the following top-level
9 domains: .biz, .us, and .va. .biz and .us also offered a Site Finder type web page
10 response.

11 19. The registries for several of these TLDs, including .biz, .museum, and .tw
12 all have agreements with ICANN. ICANN has never objected to any of these
13 registries' implementation of a wildcard service, as ICANN did with respect to
14 VeriSign's implementation of Site Finder.

15 20. For example, in May 2003, Neustar tested a wildcard service in both the
16 .biz and .us (United States) top-level domains. ICANN did not object to Neustar's
17 service.

18 21. On September 5, 2003, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the company
19 that performed the May 2003 test with Neustar, Paxfire, Inc., is talking with several
20 other TLD registries about offering similar services. A true and correct copy of this
21 newspaper article is submitted concurrently as Exhibit 52.

22 22. With respect to .museum, not only did ICANN never object to .museum's
23 implementation of a Site Finder type response, ICANN specifically provided for and
24 permitted such a response in the 2001 .museum registry agreement. A true and
25 correct copy of the pertinent provision from the .museum Registry Agreement (which
26 is publicly available on the Internet at www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/museum) is
27 submitted concurrently as Exhibit 53.
28

1 23. These other registries' Site Finder type response works in a manner
2 technically identical to Site Finder. When a user enters a nonexistent domain name
3 into the .museum TLD, for example (e.g., orlandoart.museum), the .museum page
4 informs that user that the domain name is "not in use" and directs the user to an
5 "index" where the user can view "all names in .museum" and get general information
6 about the .museum TLD.

7 24. Still other registries are considering launching wildcard services. In
8 August 2003, I was invited by the European National Top-Level Domain Registries
9 ("CENTR") to make a presentation before representatives of that group, in part,
10 because certain members of that organization, who operate European and other
11 country-code TLDs, are interested in implementing Site Finder type responses.
12

13 **IV. Internet Service Providers Also Provide Similar Services**

14 25. Application developers have always had the ability to query the DNS for
15 the presence of a wildcard in a zone. Once it is known that a wildcard exists in a
16 zone, it is possible to detect wildcard responses to address queries. Any application
17 that is currently not detecting wildcard responses and acting appropriately is doing so
18 as a direct result of design choices made by the developers of the application, not to
19 build the application to comply with applicable standards, specifically RFC 1034.

20 26. Some Internet service providers, like America Online, and some Internet
21 browsers, like Microsoft's Internet Explorer, were already offering Site Finder type
22 responses at the time Site Finder was launched.

23 27. The IP number of the Site Finder web page is identifiable. This allows
24 applications to recognize responses from the .com DNS zone server providing the IP
25 number of the Site Finder web page, and gives them an opportunity to process that
26 response.
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1 28. Accordingly, applications that use DNS responses and that were offering
2 Site Finder type responses to queries are able to recognize the Site Finder response
3 and to continue to provide the same services they were providing prior to the Site
4 Finder launch. Both Microsoft and AOL able to do so, as were other ISPs.

5 29. While these providers designed their services to be triggered by a
6 “nonexistent domain” error, these providers can configure their systems to bypass
7 Site Finder altogether. For example, the Internet Software Consortium (ISC)
8 developed software that translates the Site Finder address into a “nonexistent domain
9 error” message.

10
11 **V. Site Finder Did Not Impact the Stability of the Internet and DNS**

12 30. The Internet Architecture Board is a committee of the IETF charged with
13 oversight of the Internet standards. I have read the report of the Internet Architecture
14 Board (IAB), *Architectural Concerns on the Use of DNS Wildcards*, dated September
15 19, 2003, and available at [www.iab.org/documents/docs/2003-09-20-dns-](http://www.iab.org/documents/docs/2003-09-20-dns-wildcards.html)
16 [wildcards.html](http://www.iab.org/documents/docs/2003-09-20-dns-wildcards.html), in which the IAB states that VeriSign’s deployment of wildcard in
17 the .com TLD zone “was a legitimate use of wildcard records that did not in any way
18 violate the DNS specifications themselves.”

19 31. The introduction and operation of Site Finder did not in any manner
20 compromise the stability, security, or performance of the .com DNS servers on the
21 Domain Name System or the DNS at all.

22 32. As was the case before the introduction of Site Finder, VeriSign was
23 resolving more than 10 billion DNS queries per day and over 140,000 transactions
24 per second at a 100% availability without any slow down or security risks.

25 33. Site Finder had no impact on either the registration or resolution of domain
26 names. Responses to all queries received at the .com DNS zone servers continued to
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1 be unambiguous and accurate, and in full compliance with applicable technical
2 standards.

3 34. Further, the IAB report found no inherent weaknesses in any components
4 of the Internet's infrastructure, including the DNS, as result of a wildcard
5 deployment. In fact, the introduction and operation of Site Finder did not
6 compromise the stability of the Internet.

7
8 **VI. The IAB and SECSAC Reports Concerning Site Finder**

9 35. While the DNS, the Internet, and the connecting pieces of the Internet
10 functioned as normal while Site Finder was deployed, two Internet technical groups
11 prepared reports charging that Site Finder impacted some applications that use an
12 Internet DNS response and that were not built to contemplate a "wildcard" response
13 consistent with the DNS RFCs.

14 36. In its September 19th report, the IAB addresses what the IAB believes are
15 various possible implications of implementing standards-compliant wildcards in a
16 DNS zone, with particular emphasis on IAB's understanding of VeriSign's wildcard
17 implementation.

18 37. The IAB found no inherent weaknesses in any components of the
19 Internet's infrastructure, including the DNS or the presence of a wildcard in DNS
20 standards. The IAB also did not find that the introduction of a wildcard within a zone
21 necessarily has any significant adverse effects on the Internet infrastructure.

22 38. While the IAB commentary did not appear based on data relevant to the
23 subject it was considering, on October 6, 2003, VeriSign submitted a technical
24 response that addressed the IAB's limited application concerns which I helped to
25 prepare.

26 39. On September 22, 2003, ICANN's Security and Stability Advisory
27 Committee ("SECSAC"), submitted a report to the ICANN Board entitled,
28

1 *Recommendations Regarding VeriSign's Introduction of Wild Card Response to*
2 *Uninstantiated Domains within COM and NET* ("SECSAC Report"), available at
3 <http://www.icann.org/correspondence/secsac-to-board-22sep03.htm>.

4 40. Prior to the publication of the SECSAC report, on September 19, 2003,
5 just four days after Site Finder had been launched, the committee's chairman, Steve
6 Crocker, circulated a draft report that already included the committee's opinions and
7 recommendations but that requested facts to support those opinions and
8 recommendations.

9 41. SECSAC did not present data to support its claims and conclusions in
10 September 2003, and, as indicated by the absence of a report five months later, has
11 apparently not yet been able to find such evidence.

12 42. Prior to the issuance of the SECSAC report, SECSAC had declined
13 VeriSign's offer to provide relevant data regarding Site Finder report, and the report
14 was published without the benefit of VeriSign's input. SECSAC and ICANN also
15 cancelled scheduled meetings with VeriSign to discuss Site Finder.

16 43. The SECSAC's September 22, 2003 report was not produced in a fair,
17 open and transparent manner.

18
19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the
20 foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 29th day of April, 2004, at Dulles,
21 Virginia.

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23 

24 SCOTT A. HOLLENBECK
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