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1	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201,		
2	defendant Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN")		
3	hereby respectfully requests that, in considering its concurrently-filed motion to		
4	dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court take		
5	judicial notice of the following documents:		
6	(K) Statement of Claim to the Defendant Internet		
7	Corporation for Assigned and Numbers in Pool.com, Inc. v. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and		
8	Numbers, Court File No. 03-CV-24621 (Sup. Ct. of Justice, Ontario, Canada Jul. 8, 2003), a true and correct		
9	copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit K;		
10	(L) Bylaws for ICANN , as amended effective February 12, 2002, a true and correct copy of which is		
11	attached hereto as Exhibit L;		
12	(M) VeriSign, Inc.'s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in RegisterSite.com v.		
13	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers		
14	et. al., Case No. CV 04-1368 ÅBC (CWx) (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2004) (hereinafter "VeriSign's RegisterSite Motion") a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as		
15	true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit M; and		
16	(N) September 22, 2003 Message from Security and		
17	(N) September 22, 2003 Message from Security and Stability Advisory Committee ("SSAC") to ICANN Board, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit N.		
18	These documents constitute facts not reasonably subject to dispute.		
19	Accordingly, they may be properly considered in connection with the Court's		
20	consideration of ICANN's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.		
21	LEGAL STANDARD		
22	"[A] district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document the		
23	authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff's complaint		
24	necessarily relies." Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); see		
25	Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (under the Ninth Circuit's		
26	"incorporation by reference" rule, a court may look beyond the pleadings without		
27	converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment). This		
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includes documents that are integral to plaintiff's claim but not explicitly incorporated in the complaint. *Id. See also Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A.*, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (taking judicial notice of signed contracts relied upon in the complaint but not incorporated); *In re Northpoint Communs. Group, Inc., Sec. Litig.*, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of a document if it is relied on in the complaint (regardless of whether it is expressly incorporated therein) and its authenticity is not disputed.")

A court may also properly take notice of "matters of public record" pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence section 201, to the extent they are not subject to reasonable dispute. *Lee v. City of Los Angeles*, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). This includes allegations made in pleadings and other documents filed in other lawsuits. *See Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. City of Burbank*, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998) (taking judicial notice of pleadings filed in state court action); *MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman*, 803 F.2d 500, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1986) (taking judicial notice of allegations made in motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum filed in different federal court action); *Kent v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (taking judicial notice of legal memorandum filed in state court action). Judicial notice of matters of public record will not convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion. *Lee*, 250 F.3d at 688; *Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital*, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); *Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal.*, *N.A.*, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1112 n. 37 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (same).

ARGUMENT

The allegations in VeriSign's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") are inextricably intertwined with the following three documents that this court may judicially notice. Judicial notice of these documents is necessary to give the Court

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a more complete understanding of the facts upon which VeriSign's entire FAC rests.

Statement of Claim in Pool.com (Exhibit K)

VeriSign contends that ICANN was "captured" by certain members of its Registrar Constituency, including Pool.com, and that, as a result of this "capture," ICANN delayed introduction of VeriSign's proposed Wait List Service ("WLS"). *See, e.g.*, FAC ¶¶ 39-46, 90. The fact that ICANN is currently defending itself in litigation concerning the steps it has taken toward *approving* VeriSign's implementation of WLS proves the lie to VeriSign's allegations regarding the notion that some group of conspirators has exercised improper or anticompetitive "control" of ICANN's Board of Directors. *Id.* at ¶ 90. In the *Pool.com* litigation, Pool.com contends that ICANN is a proponent of VeriSign's WLS and that ICANN's conduct with regard to the WLS has constituted a breach of its accreditation agreements with registrars. *See* Exhibit A ¶¶ 12-14.

The *Pool.com* Statement of Claim is a record of the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada ("Ontario Court") and is being offered to show the existence of the litigation, the identity of the parties and the subject of the dispute. The *Pool.com* litigation is not a fact subject to reasonable dispute and is maintained by the clerk of the Ontario Court. Therefore, the *Pool.com* claim may be judicially noticed. *Lee*, 250 F.3d at 689.

ICANN's Bylaws (Exhibit L)

VeriSign's Sherman Act Section 1 claim expressly relies on, and incorporates by reference, the ICANN Bylaws in effect at the time of the alleged wrongdoing by ICANN. *See*, *e.g.*, FAC ¶ 102. The foundation of VeriSign's claim is premised on the notion that ICANN's Board was captured and controlled by the alleged coconspirators. However, in its attempt to show this alleged"control", VeriSign severely misrepresents the language of the Bylaws, incorrectly asserting that the ICANN Board was "bound to accept" the recommendations of the DNSO, one of

ICANN's supporting organizations. <i>Id.</i> at \P 95. The bylaws in effect at the time				
make clear that the Board had the final authority to accept or reject a				
recommendation from its supporting organizations and advisory committees. RJN				
Ex. L (Feb. 12, 2002 Bylaws); Art. VI § 2(b) ("The Supporting Organizations shall				
serve as advisory bodies to the Board"); Id. at §2(e) ("No recommendation of a				
Supporting Organization shall be adopted unless the votes in favor of adoption				
would be sufficient for adoption by the Board without taking account of either the				
Directors selected by the Supporting Organizations or their votes"); <i>Id.</i> at §2(g)				
("Nothing in this Section 2 is intended to limit the powers of the Board or the				
Corporation") Moreover, in enumerating the powers of the supporting				
organizations, the Bylaws explicitly give the Board the ability to reject a				
recommendation of a supporting organization. Indeed, there are certain instances				
where the Board must not accept the recommendation of a supporting organization.				
See id. at Art. VI, § 2(e), (f). ICANN's Bylaws are not a fact subject to reasonable				
dispute, and they are publicly available on ICANN's web site. See				
http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-12feb02.htm. Therefore,				
ICANN's Bylaws may be judicially noticed. Parrino, 146 F.3d at 706.				

VeriSign's RegisterSite Motion (Exhibit M)

In its FAC, VeriSign alleges the existence of a new secondary domain name market that VeriSign contends is an appropriate relevant product market for antitrust purposes. FAC ¶ 106. This allegation comes as quite a surprise considering the fact that VeriSign itself explained, in concurrently pending litigation, why this proposed new relevant market does not exist. *See* Exhibit C at 21:10:17. In the *RegisterSite* litigation, plaintiffs brought an action against VeriSign and ICANN before Judge Collins, seeking to stop the introduction of WLS. VeriSign argued that WLS does not involve a distinct market from the services for the registration of all domain names. *Id.* VeriSign's RegisterSite Motion, which VeriSign filed in response to the plaintiff's First Amended

Complaint in that case, is a record of this Court and is being offered for the existence of the arguments VeriSign made to this Court, not for the truth or accuracy of those arguments. *MGIC*, 803 F.3d at 504-5. VeriSign's RegisterSite Motion is a fact not subject to reasonable dispute and is maintained by the clerk of this Court. Therefore, VeriSign's RegisterSite Motion may be judicially noticed. *Lee*, 250 F.3d at 689.

SSAC September 22, 2003 Message to ICANN Board (Exhibit N)

VeriSign contends that certain alleged members of ICANN's Security and Stability Advisory Committee ("SSAC") captured and controlled SSAC's processes with respect to VeriSign's wildcard product (which it calls Site Finder). FAC ¶ 130. As evidence of this alleged capture, VeriSign points to a September 22, 2003 message from SSAC to the ICANN Board regarding VeriSign's wildcard product ("SSAC Message"). VeriSign asserts that ICANN "took action based on the SSAC message and that the "report does not include any facts concerning the effects of Site Finder or any analysis supporting the report's opinions and recommendations that the service be immediately terminated." FAC ¶¶ 134, 136. However, the SSAC simply does not support this allegation. The SSAC Message is not a final report documenting SSAC's findings, analysis and conclusions. Indeed it is not a "report" at all. The message was posted shortly after VeriSign deployed its wildcard. It contains background information regarding the wildcard and its effect on the internet; details regarding SSAC's ongoing examination of the situation; and SSAC's preliminary opinions and recommendations. The document in no way supports VeriSign's conspiracy theory. Where, as here, the "plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent document as part of his pleading, [the] defendant may introduce the exhibit as part of his motion attacking the pleading." Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1327, at 762-63 (2d ed. 1990)). The SSAC Message is a fact not subject to

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1	reasonable dispute and it is publicly available on ICANN's website. See		
2	http://www.icann.org/correspondence/secsac-to-board-22sep03.htm.		
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4	Dated: July 6, 2004	JONES DAY	
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6		Ву:	
7		Jeffrey A. LeVee	
8		Attorneys for Defendant INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS	
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