



VeriSign Site Finder

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SECSAC Open Meeting
7 October 2003**

- ▶ **What is VeriSign Site Finder?**
- ▶ **Site Finder Implementation**
- ▶ **Technical Questions Raised**
- ▶ **DNS Wildcard Guidelines**
- ▶ **Questions?**

What is VeriSign Site Finder

- ▶ **Uses DNS wildcard “A” record in the .com and .net zones (specifics on next slide)**
- ▶ **Provides web search assistance**
 - Attempts to match a requested web site with a known web site
 - Offers other search alternatives
- ▶ **Provides other protocol-defined responses**
- ▶ **Web and mail examples:**
 - <http://sitefinder.verisign.com>
 - <http://www.bookstoore.com>
 - <mailto:user@bookstoore.com>

▶ Before Site Finder

```
> dig @a.gtld-servers.net. bookstoore.com.

; <<>> DiG 8.1 <<>> @a.gtld-servers.net. bookstoore.com.
; (1 server found)
;; res options: init recurs defnam dnsrch
;; got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 10
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUERY SECTION:
;;      bookstoore.com, type = A, class = IN

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
// More dig output...
```

▶ After Site Finder

```
> dig @a.gtld-servers.net. bookstoore.com.

; <<>> DiG 8.1 <<>> @a.gtld-servers.net. bookstoore.com.
; (1 server found)
;; res options: init recurs defnam dnsrch
;; got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 10
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 13, ADDITIONAL: 13
;; QUERY SECTION:
;;      bookstoore.com, type = A, class = IN

;; ANSWER SECTION:
bookstoore.com.          15M IN A          64.94.110.11
// More dig output...
```

- ▶ **Service is based on considered analysis of requests**
 - Provides web search assistance
 - Provides other protocol-defined responses
- ▶ **Details described in a public white paper**
 - <http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/sitefinder/>
- ▶ **Extensive testing prior to launch**
- ▶ **Formation of Technical Review Panel**
 - <http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/sitefinder/trp.html>
- ▶ **Ongoing monitoring program**

Site Finder Protocol Connection Statistics

- ▶ **85%+ of all connection attempts are for HTTP or SMTP**
- ▶ **TCP reset returned for other TCP protocols**
- ▶ **ICMP port unreachable returned for UDP protocols**
- ▶ **Many different protocols make up the remaining 2.51%**

Port	Protocol	%	Cumulative %
80/tcp	HTTP	68.81%	68.81%
25/tcp	SMTP	17.06%	85.87%
6667/tcp	IRC	4.33%	90.21%
53/udp	DNS	3.25%	93.46%
135/tcp	epmap	1.14%	94.60%
110/tcp	pop3	0.56%	95.16%
445/tcp	microsoft-ds	0.44%	95.60%
137/udp	netbios-ns	0.28%	95.88%
139/tcp	netbios-ssn	0.26%	96.14%
21/tcp	ftp	0.25%	96.39%
3531/tcp	joltid	0.16%	96.55%
56498/tcp		0.15%	96.70%
22555/tcp	vocaltec-wconf	0.14%	96.84%
54510/tcp		0.14%	96.99%
3473/tcp	jaugsremotec-2	0.14%	97.12%
17027/tcp		0.13%	97.25%
119/tcp	nntp	0.13%	97.38%
8080/tcp	http-alt	0.11%	97.49%

Technical Questions Raised

- ▶ **VeriSign is listening to the issues raised by the technical community**
 - IAB commentary
 - SECSAC message
 - Technical discussion venues
 - Input to VeriSign support lines
- ▶ **VeriSign is maintaining and updating a technical FAQ**
 - <http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/sitefinder/info.html>
- ▶ **VeriSign has prepared an extensive response to the issues raised by the IAB and SECSAC**
 - <http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/sitefinder/>
- ▶ **Will speak to a few of those issues today**

- ▶ **Improved stub mail server to bounce messages using a non-existent domain in the recipient address**
- ▶ **Considering a wildcard MX record to provide a “name error” response instead of Site Finder address**
 - SMTP server can be eliminated if this works well

▶ Dead RBLs

- Dorkslayers.com – issue was resolved on 16 September

▶ Forward DNS lookup of sender domain

- Many spam services have given up on this technique – spammers have moved on
- Our empirical analysis shows this technique catches 3% of spam. We are looking for more empirically-based statistics

- ▶ **Misconfiguring software with a non-existent domain name**
 - Used to return RCODE=3, which would provoke some terminal failure in whatever program
 - ▶ Not if the misconfiguration used a wrong, but *existing* domain or the non-existent domain was later registered
 - It's hard to size this issue definitively
 - ▶ MX misconfiguration is *very* rare in practice
 - ▶ Of more than 20 million MX records for .com and .net, less than one tenth of one percent of these records (only 0.077% to be precise) are misconfigured

▶ Privacy

- Not collecting or retaining data per these statements
<http://sitefinder.verisign.com/privacy.jsp>

▶ Single point of failure, attack

- VeriSign has a proven track record for providing reliable, high-volume services
 - ▶ VeriSign has operated the .com and .net name servers with 100% uptime over the past six years
- VeriSign performs regular daily monitoring
- Service outage produces timeout or other error message

Anything else?

- ▶ **Will be happy to take questions at end**
- ▶ **Questions also answered via email**
 - sitefinder@verisign-grs.com

Moving forward: DNS Wildcard Guidelines

Wildcards exist in TLD zones, and we believe it is appropriate to document good technical practice

- ▶ **Deployed or tested prior to Site Finder: .biz, .bz, .cc, .cn, .cx, .mp, .museum, .nu, .ph, .pw, .pd, .tk, .tv, .tw, .us, .va, .ws**
- ▶ **Public draft guidelines now available**
 - <http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/sitefinder/>
 - Guidelines describe strategies derived from extensive analysis
 - Incorporate ideas gleaned from comments received over the last year
 - ▶ IAB, CENTR, public input
 - Further work anticipated; comments welcome
- ▶ **Consistent behavior would be a “Good Thing”**

- ▶ **Email follow-up**
 - sitefinder@verisign-grs.com