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11 DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST

12 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

13 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – WESTERN DIVISION**

14 DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR
18 ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS
19 and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

20 Defendants.

21 Case No. 2:16-cv-00862-RGK (JCx)

22 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND
23 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
24 INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM
25 OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

26 Date: April 4, 2016

27 Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

28 Courtroom: 850

[Filed concurrently: Declarations of
Sophia Bekele Eshete, Ethan J. Brown
& Sara C. Colón; Application for
Leave to File Under Seal; [Proposed]
Order; and [Proposed] Order for
Application for Leave to File Under
Seal]

1 **TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on April 4, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon
3 thereafter as the matter may be heard, before the Honorable R. Gary Klausner of
4 the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Western
5 Division, Courtroom 850, located at 255 E. Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA
6 90012-3332, Plaintiff DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST (“DCA”) will and does
7 move for a preliminary injunction ordering Defendant Internet Company for
8 Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) from issuing the .Africa generic top
9 level domain (“gTLD”) until this case has been resolved.

10 This Motion is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 on the
11 grounds that ICANN has failed to follow a binding arbitration order against it and
12 has denied DCA the fair and unbiased gTLD application process it is entitled to.
13 Therefore, ICANN should be prevented from issuing the .Africa gTLD until this
14 case has been resolved. The .Africa gTLD is a unique asset and DCA will suffer
15 irreparable harm if the .Africa gTLD is awarded to another party.

16 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the papers,
17 records, and pleadings on file in this case, and on such oral argument as the Court
18 allows.

19
20 Dated: March 1, 2016

BROWN NERI & SMITH LLP

21
22 By: /s/ Ethan J. Brown

23 Ethan J. Brown

24
25 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
26 DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Defendant Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
4 (“ICANN”) was delegated the task of issuing generic top level domains (“gTLD”)
5 such as “.com”, “.org”, or, in this case, “.Africa” by the U.S. Department of
6 Commerce for the benefit of the community of users of the Internet. ICANN
7 boasts of its transparency, fairness, and open process in order to comply with its
8 government mandated purpose and to avoid any impression of impropriety. In this
9 case, however, ICANN has subverted those ideals articulated in its Articles,
10 Bylaws, and internal rules in taking sides in the granting of the .Africa gTLD –
11 instead of maintaining the role it is required to play as a neutral arbiter.

12 This case concerns ICANN’s process for granting the rights to a geographic
13 gTLD, .Africa. There are two competing applications for .Africa, Plaintiff
14 DotConnectAfrica Trust (“DCA”) and Defendant ZA Central Registry (“ZACR”),
15 purportedly sponsored by the African Union and for reasons known best to
16 ICANN, favored at every opportunity by ICANN’s Board and constituent bodies.
17 Critically, ICANN’s own internal independent review process (“IRP”) has already
18 done the hard work of reviewing ICANN’s processes for granting .Africa and
19 finding them in clear violation of ICANN’s own Articles, Bylaws, and rules.

20 But, despite the IRP’s extensive 63-page decision outlining ICANN’s
21 wrongful conduct and recommendations, ICANN simply “thumbed its nose” at the
22 IRP, insisting that its decision is non-binding. After losing the IRP on all counts,
23 ICANN placed DCA’s long-pending application back to the beginning of the
24 process, contrary to the IRP ruling, and loaded the dice ensuring the application
25 would once again be denied – which it was on February 17, 2016, before the filing
26 of this action.

27 Now, DCA faces irreparable harm. Having denied DCA’s application,
28 ICANN is free to grant .Africa to its favored applicant, ZACR, which it surely

1 intends to do at its upcoming March 5-10 Board meeting in Marrakech, Morocco.
2 Indeed, DCA recently asked for assurance from ICANN’s counsel that .Africa
3 would not be granted at the meeting; the assurance was refused. ICANN already
4 once hastily granted ZACR the rights in March 2014 before it was enjoined by the
5 IRP panel during the pendency of the IRP review. History is repeating itself.
6 Once .Africa is granted and rights to use it are granted to users, DCA’s rights to
7 this highly unique asset will be forever lost.

8 Given DCA’s overwhelming victory before the IRP panel and ICANN’s
9 continued bad faith conduct refusing it fair treatment, DCA has a high likelihood
10 of success on the merits. Indeed, ICANN’s primary defense appears to be a self-
11 serving prospective release and waiver of all rights to a judicial remedy, which
12 ICANN forces all applicants to execute given its monopolistic power to grant the
13 use of gTLDs. But, ICANN’s “silver bullet” prospective release goes too far,
14 purporting to absolve ICANN for even the grossest intentional misconduct and is
15 thus void as a matter of law.

16 All the relevant factors favor the issuance of a preliminary injunction barring
17 ICANN from issuing the rights to .Africa until this case is resolved, and DCA
18 respectfully requests this Court grant that very relief.

19 **II. RELEVANT FACTS**

20 **A. ICANN**

21 ICANN is a California non-profit established for the benefit of the Internet
22 community and is tasked with carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant
23 principles law and through open and transparent processes that enable competition
24 and open-entry in Internet-related markets. (Declaration of Sophia Bekele (“Bekele
25 Decl.”), Ex. 1 at ¶4). ICANN is the only organization in the world that assigns
26 rights to Generic Top-level Domains (“gTLDs”). It therefore yields monopolistic
27 power and can and does force participants in the market for gTLDs to play by its
28 onerous and sometimes self-serving rules.

1 The following core principles guide the decisions and actions of ICANN: (a)
2 Preserve and enhance the operational stability of the Internet; (b) Employ open and
3 transparent policy development mechanisms that promote well-informed decisions;
4 (c) Make decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively with
5 integrity and fairness; and (d) Remain accountable to the Internet community
6 through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness. (Bekele Decl. ¶12, Ex.
7 4 at Art. 1 § 2). ICANN’s own Bylaws state that it shall not apply its standards
8 inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment. (Bekele Decl.
9 ¶12, Ex. 4 at Art. 2 § 3). ICANN is accountable to the Internet community for
10 operating in a manner consistent with its Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation as a
11 whole. (Bekele Decl. ¶12, Ex. 4 at Art. 4 § 1).

12 **B. DCA and the Top-Level Domain Application**

13 DCA was formed with the charitable purpose of advancing information
14 technology education in Africa and providing a continental Internet domain name
15 to provide access to internet services for the people of Africa. (Bekele Decl. ¶5,
16 Ex. 1 ¶2). In March 2012, DCA applied to ICANN for the delegation of the
17 .Africa top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains (“gTLD”)
18 Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”), an internet resource
19 available for delegation under that program. (Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶3). In order
20 to submit an application for a gTLD, all applicants were required to agree to the
21 terms of the gTLD Applicant’s Guidebook (the “Guidebook”). (See Bekele Decl.
22 ¶¶7–11). In consideration of ICANN’s promises to abide by its own Bylaws, the
23 Guidebook, and in conformity with the laws of fair competition, Plaintiff paid
24 ICANN a \$185,000.00 mandatory application fee. (See Bekele Decl. ¶4).

25 ICANN required that applicants for the rights to a geographic gTLD such as
26 .Africa obtain endorsements from 60% of the national governments in the region,
27 and no more than one written statement of objection to the application from
28 relevant governments in the region and/or public authorities associated with the the

1 region. (Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3 at § 2.2.1.4.2). As part of its bid to apply for the
2 delegation rights of the .Africa gTLD, Plaintiff obtained the endorsements of the
3 African Union Commission (hereinafter the “AUC”) and the United Nations
4 Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (Bekele Decl. ¶14, Ex. 6; ¶16, Ex. 8).
5 Plaintiff was the first to obtain official endorsements/letters of support for the
6 .Africa Internet domain name from these organizations.

7 In April 2010, nearly a year later, AUC wrote DCA and informed DCA that
8 it had “reconsidered its approach in implementing the subject Internet Domain
9 Name (.Africa) and no longer endorses individual initiatives in this matter[.]”
10 However, the letter did not expressly withdraw its endorsement of DCA. (Bekele
11 Decl. ¶15, Ex. 7). Section 2.2.1.4.3 of the Guidebook states that a governmental
12 entity may only withdraw its endorsement if the conditions of its endorsement have
13 not been satisfied: “...government may withdraw its support for an application at a
14 later time...*if the registry operator has deviated from the conditions of original*
15 *support or non-objection.*” (emphasis added) (Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 1 at §
16 2.2.1.4.3). There were no conditions on the AUC or UNECA endorsements to
17 DCA. (See Bekele Decl. ¶14, Ex. 6; ¶16, Ex. 8).

18 **C. ZACR and AUC’s Top Level Domain Application**

19 AUC presumably tried to withdraw its support of DCA because AUC itself
20 attempted in 2011 to obtain the rights to .Africa by requesting that ICANN include
21 .Africa in the List of Top-Level Reserved Names. (See Bekele Decl. ¶22, Ex. 14 at
22 1). This would mean that the .Africa gTLD and its equivalent in other languages
23 would be unavailable for delegation under the New gTLD Program, which in turn
24 would enable AUC to benefit from a special legislative protection that would allow
25 AUC to delegate .Africa to itself. DCA protested that this would not be in
26 compliance with the gTLD guidelines. ICANN denied AUC’s request to reserve
27 .Africa but assisted AUC in obtaining the .Africa delegation rights through ZACR
28 as AUC’s proxy. (See Bekele Decl. ¶22, Ex. 14 at 2). In violation of its duties to

1 act independently and transparently, ICANN, explained to AUC in a letter exactly
2 how to combat a competing application using the Governmental Advisory
3 Committee process. (*Id.*) In exchange for AUC’s endorsement, ZACR agreed to
4 allow AUC to “retain all rights relating to dotAfrica TLD.” (Bekele Decl. ¶32,
5 Ex. 20 at 616–17). The AUC also had other motives for favoring ZACR. The
6 members of the AUC committee formed to choose who to endorse for the .Africa
7 gTLD were individuals who were also members of other organizations affiliated
8 with ZACR. (Bekele Decl. ¶31).

9 ZACR represented that it was applying for the .Africa gTLD on behalf of the
10 “African community.” (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶33, Ex. 21). However, it failed to
11 submit the required type of application for organizations applying on behalf of a
12 “community” which is a term of designation and differentiation for gTLDs. (*See*
13 Bekele Decl. ¶32, Ex. 20 at 616). Nevertheless, ICANN processed ZACR’s
14 “standard” application. ZACR also made multiple misrepresentations to ICANN
15 to edge DCA out including that it had the large number of qualifying endorsements
16 from African governments sufficient to meet the 60% threshold under ICANN
17 rules. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶32, Ex. 20; ¶34; ¶5, Ex. 1 at ¶80). In fact, ZACR’s
18 purported governmental endorsements were not qualifying. (*See Id.*)

19 **D. The Geographic Names Panel and InterConnect Communications**

20 ICANN contracted with a private company InterConnect Communications
21 (“ICC”) to perform a review of geographic name applications as ICANN’s
22 Geographic Name Panel. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶35, Ex. at 22). The ICC warned that
23 if ICANN did not accept endorsement letters from regional authorities like the
24 AUC and UNECA, ZACR’s application would fail. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶36, Ex.
25 23). ICANN asserted during the IRP that it had taken both the AUC and UNECA
26 endorsements into account in evaluating DCA’s application. (Bekele Decl. ¶ 5,
27 Ex. 1 ¶90). However, had ICANN treated DCA’s and ZACR’s AUC endorsements
28 equally, both DCA and ZACR should have either passed or failed the endorsement

1 requirement. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶36, Ex. 23.) Rather, ICANN conspired to accept
2 ZACR’s endorsements as sufficient while disregarding Plaintiff’s endorsements.

3 **E. The GAC**

4 ICANN has a Governmental Advisory Committee (“GAC”) whose purpose,
5 according to ICANN’s Bylaws, is to “consider and provide advice on the activities
6 of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments.” (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶12, Ex.
7 4 at Art. 11 § 2(1)(a)). By invitation, membership on the GAC is open to
8 “[e]conomies as recognized in the international fora, and multinational
9 governmental organizations.” (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶12, Ex. 4 at Art. 11 § 2(1)(b)).
10 The AUC became a member of the GAC in 2012, apparently on the advice of
11 ICANN. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶22, Ex. 14 at 1). Having encouraged the AUC’s
12 membership, and having given the AUC instructions on how to use GAC
13 proceedings to derail DCA, ICANN then allowed AUC to use the GAC as a
14 vehicle for the issuance of advice against DCA’s application by DCA’s only
15 competitor for .Africa, the AUC through ZACR, effectively ensuring that the rights
16 to .Africa would be delegated to ZACR. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶22, Ex. 14).

17 Specifically, ICANN allowed the GAC to issue a “consensus advice” that
18 DCA’s application should not proceed due to issues with the regional
19 endorsements. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶39, Ex. 26 at 3). Under ICANN’s rules, the
20 GAC can recommend that ICANN cease reviewing an application if *all* of the
21 GAC members agree that an application should not proceed because an applicant is
22 sensitive, violates national law or is problematic. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶88;
23 ¶42, Ex. 29 at Art. 12, Principle 47). However, not all of the members of the GAC
24 agreed that DCA’s application should be stopped. Kenya’s representative was not
25 even present at the GAC meeting when the advice was issued, but ICANN
26 nonetheless allowed the AUC (through Alice Munyua) to make a statement on
27 Kenya’s behalf denouncing DCA’s application, even though the current Kenya
28 GAC advisor wrote to the GAC chairperson to inform her that Ms. Munyua did not

1 represent Kenya or its viewpoints and that he objected to a GAC consensus advice
2 on .Africa. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶37, Ex. 24; ¶38, Ex. 25].

3 Moreover, the GAC gave no indication that it considered the DCA’s
4 application was problematic, violated law or was sensitive - the required standard.
5 (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶104 (“[ICANN’s witness] also stated that the GAC
6 made its decision without providing any rationale and primarily based on politics
7 and not on potential violations of national laws and sensitivities.”)) In June 2013,
8 the New gLTD Program Committee (“NGPC”) accepted the GAC’s advice despite
9 the aforementioned flaws in the GAC’s process. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 1 ¶
10 106). ICANN rejected DCA’s application on the basis of the GAC advice while
11 ZACR’s application continued. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 80, 106; ¶40, Ex.
12 27). Although ICANN could have reconsidered this decision under its rules, it
13 refused to do so. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶6; ¶7, Ex. 3 at Art. 4 § 2.2).

14 Meanwhile, ZACR passed the initial evaluation and entered into the
15 contracting phase with ICANN. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶13; ¶40, Ex. 27).
16 ZACR did not have sufficient country specific endorsements to meet the ICANN
17 requirements for geographic gTLDs. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶36, Ex. 23). ZACR filed
18 purported support letters endorsing the AUC’s “Reserved Names” initiative, along
19 with declarations made by the AUC regarding its intention to reserve .Africa for its
20 own use along with its appointment letter from the AUC as evidence of such
21 support. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶32, Ex. 20). Only five of the purported endorsement
22 letters submitted by ZACR from African governments actually referenced ZACR
23 by name. (*See* Bekele Decl. ¶34). Presumably, given the clear limitations of these
24 purported endorsements, ZACR passed on the basis of the same regional
25 endorsements that ICANN and GAC had used to derail Plaintiff’s application.

26 **F. The Independent Review Process**

27 The Guidebook terms DCA agreed to upon submitting its gTLD application
28 contained a release and covenant not to sue (the “Prospective Release”):

1 “Applicant hereby releases ICANN...from any and all claims by applicant that
2 arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action, or failure to
3 act, by ICANN...in connection with ICANN’s or an ICANN Affiliated Party’s
4 review of this application, investigation or verification, and any characterization or
5 description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of
6 this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend, or not to recommend,
7 the approval of applicant’s gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO
8 CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR IN ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY
9 FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE
10 APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR
11 PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF
12 ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN AND ICANN AFILIATED
13 PARTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION.” (See Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex.
14 3 at Module 6, ¶6).

15 ICANN instead purports to provide applicants with an independent review
16 process (“IRP”), as a means to challenge ICANN’s actions with respect to a gTLD
17 application: (See Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3 §§ 3.2.3; 6). The IRP is effectively an
18 arbitration, operated by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the
19 American Arbitration Association, comprised of an independent panel of
20 arbitrators. (See Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3 § 3.2.3).

21 In October 2013, DCA successfully sought an IRP to review ICANN’s
22 processing of its application, including ICANN’s handling of the GAC opinion.
23 (See Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 at ¶9). DCA’s panel was comprised of the Honorable
24 William J. Cahill (Ret.)(who replaced the Honorable Richard C. Neal (Ret.) after
25 his passing), Babak Barin, and Professor Catherine Kessedjian. (See Bekele Decl.
26 ¶5, Ex. 1 at 1). Judge Cahill is a JAMS arbitrator and former judge in San
27 Francisco County Superior Court. Mr. Barin and Ms. Kessedjian are both
28 experienced professors of international law as well as experienced arbitrators.

1 **G. ICANN Ignores the IRP’s Authority**

2 Despite the initiation of the IRP, ICANN continued to review ZACR’s
3 application – *even going so far as to sign a contract for the operation of .Africa*
4 *with ZACR.* (Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶¶12– 20; ¶9, Ex. 9. The IRP panel, during
5 emergency proceedings, found that this was improper and enjoined further
6 issuance of .Africa to ZACR. (*See id.*). The IRP panel issued a final and thorough
7 63-page declaration in the matter on July 9, 2015. The panel found, *inter alia*, that:

- 8 a. The IRP arbitration was binding, despite ICANN’s protests to the contrary.
9 (Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶23).
- 10 b. ICANN’s actions and inactions with respect to DCA’s application were
11 inconsistent with ICANN’s bylaws and articles of incorporation. (Bekele
12 Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶109).
- 13 c. ICANN should “continue to refrain from delegating the .Africa gTLD and
14 permit DCA Trust’s application to proceed through the remainder of the new
15 gTLD application process.” (Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶133).

16 This was the first time in its new gTLD history that ICANN was *not* the
17 prevailing party in an IRP.

18 **H. ICANN’s Processing of DCA’s Application After the IRP**
19 **Declaration**

20 ICANN did not act in accordance with the IRP’s Final Declaration. (*See*
21 *Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 ¶23*). Instead of allowing DCA’s application to proceed
22 through the remainder of the application process, ICANN restarted DCA’s
23 application and re-reviewed its endorsements. (Bekele Decl. ¶¶ 23–24, Ex. 15).
24 ICANN intended to deny DCA’s application. For example, in September 2015
25 ICANN issued DCA clarifying questions regarding its endorsements and then
26 indicated that DCA’s responses were inadequate. Hoping to gain insight into what
27 exactly was allegedly wrong with its application, DCA agreed to an extended
28 evaluation. (Bekele Decl. ¶29). But, ICANN merely asked the exact same

1 questions without further guidance or clarification, clearly a pretext to deny DCA’s
2 application. (*Id.*). After all, ICANN had already entered into a registry agreement
3 with ZACR, as ICANN’s general counsel had made public *after* the IRP
4 Declaration issuance. In short, the process ICANN put Plaintiff through was a
5 sham with a predetermined ending – ICANN’s denial of Plaintiff’s application so
6 that ICANN could steer the gTLD to ZACR.

7 **I. ICANN’s Issuance of the .Africa gTLD is Imminent**

8 In February 2016, ICANN rejected DCA’s application after the extended
9 evaluation. (Bekele Decl. ¶28, Ex. 18). It is believed that ICANN is on the verge
10 of awarding .Africa to ZACR. On March 5, 2016, ICANN is holding a board
11 meeting in Morocco, Africa where it is expected to officially give the .Africa rights
12 to ZACR. (Bekele Decl. ¶41, Ex. 28). In fact, when DCA sought assurance from
13 ICANN’s counsel that .Africa would not be granted at the meeting, the assurance
14 was refused. (Declaration of Ethan J. Brown ¶2). Now, despite its pending
15 complaint against ICANN, DCA stands to face another wrongful and unfair
16 delegation of the .Africa gTLD.

17 **III. LEGAL STANDARD**

18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that: (1) The court may issue a
19 preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party and (2) before or after
20 beginning a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may
21 advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P.
22 65. “The basis for injunctive relief [] in the federal courts has always been
23 irreparably injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.” *Weinberger v. Romero-*
24 *Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). “District courts in the Ninth Circuit use two
25 tests when analyzing a request for a temporary or preliminary injunction: the
26 ‘traditional-’ and ‘alternative-’ criteria tests.” *Imperial v. Castruita*, 418 F.Supp.2d
27 1174, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

1 Under the former test, the plaintiff must show "(1) a strong likelihood of
2 success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if
3 preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff,
4 and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases)." *Id.* Under the
5 alternative, or "serious questions" test, "a preliminary injunction is appropriate
6 when a plaintiff demonstrates that "serious questions going to the merits were
7 raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor." *Towery v.*
8 *Brewer*, 672 F.3d 650, 657 (9th Cir. 2012). This approach requires that the
9 elements of the preliminary injunction test be balanced, so that a stronger showing
10 of one element may offset and a weaker showing of another." *Id.* Under either test,
11 DCA is likely to succeed on the merits and is likely to suffer irreparable harm,
12 balancing the scales heavily in its favor. Given the public nature of ICANN and
13 the internet as a whole, issuing gTLDs in a fair, transparent process is in the
14 public's interest. A preliminary injunction should issue.

15 **IV. ARGUMENT**

16 **A. DCA will prevail on the merits for declaratory relief and the** 17 **injunction will preserve the status quo.**

18 DCA has already demonstrated that it is entitled to the relief it seeks (as
19 evidenced by the IRP decision) and satisfies the elements for a preliminary
20 injunction under either standard. DCA only moves for a preliminary injunction
21 under its ninth cause of action against ICANN for declaratory relief. "The function
22 of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the *status quo ante litem* pending a
23 determination of the action on the merits. The status quo is the last uncontested
24 status preceding the commencement of the controversy." *Washington Capitals*
25 *Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry*, 419 F.2d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1969). ICANN has not
26 issued the rights to the .Africa gTLD. Until DCA is afforded the relief determined
27 by ICANN's own IRP Declaration, the .Africa gTLD should not issue. For the
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1 reasons demonstrated below, and determined by ICANN’s IRP, DCA has already
2 largely succeeded on the merits of its claim before the IRP.

3 i. DCA meets the elements under the traditional test
4 for a preliminary injunction.

5 1. DCA demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on
6 the merits of its ninth cause of action.

7 DCA’s ninth cause of action seeks a declaration from the Court that it is
8 entitled to proceed through the remainder of the .Africa gTLD application process
9 as expressed by the IRP findings. As an initial matter, DCA’s claim for
10 declaratory relief is proper. The federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides that
11 “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction...any court of the United
12 States...may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
13 seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28
14 U.S.C. §2201(a). In determining whether a plaintiff’s claim properly invokes the
15 [Declaratory Judgment] Act, courts consider “whether the facts alleged, under all
16 of the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between the
17 parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
18 warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” *Ours Tech, Inc. v. Data Drive*
19 *Thru, Inc.*, 645 F.Supp.2d 830, 834 (internal cites omitted).

20 An actual dispute exists between DCA and ICANN because ICANN is
21 denying DCA the proper application processing according to the IRP. The IRP
22 ruled that ICANN failed to follow its articles of incorporation, by-laws, and other
23 guidelines for processing DCA’s application. The IRP also ruled that DCA should
24 be allowed to “proceed through the *remainder* of the new gTLD process (emphasis
25 added).” ICANN refused to follow the IRP ruling, and placed DCA back to the
26 start of the application. (*See Bekele Decl.* ¶24, Ex. 15). DCA complained that this
27 was not proper. The controversy is not conjectural, but actual.
28

1 Moreover, DCA will be able to show that it met ICANN’s geographic
2 endorsement standards, or at the very least that its endorsements were no less
3 adequate than ZACR’s¹, ICANN’s favored applicant. (See Bekele Decl. ¶14, Ex. 6;
4 ¶16, Ex. 8; ¶36, Ex. 23). At the time the IRP proceeding commenced, DCA’s
5 endorsers (AUC and UNECA) had been approved as endorsers by ICANN. (See
6 Bekele Decl. ¶5, Ex. 1 at ¶45). Both of those entities are representative of nearly
7 all the nations in Africa, far more than 60% (See Bekele Decl. ¶30, Ex. 19 at 601).
8 Although ICANN has asserted that the AUC and UNECA withdrew their
9 endorsements from DCA, a withdrawal is only permitted after an applicant applies
10 if an applicant has failed to meet one of the conditions of its endorsement. (See
11 Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3 at § 2.2.1.4.3) There were no conditions on either the AUC
12 or UNECA endorsements; therefore any attempted withdrawal of those
13 endorsements is improper. (See Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3 at § 2.2.1.4.3; ¶14, Ex. 6;
14 ¶16, Ex. 8).

15 Accordingly, DCA demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the merits
16 with regard to its claim for declaratory relief that it is entitled to the gTLD
17 application process it was promised.

18 2. DCA will suffer irreparable injury if the .Africa gTLD
19 is awarded to another party.

20 Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury because the .Africa gTLD is a unique
21 asset for which Plaintiff cannot be compensated through monetary damages. “The
22 key word in this consideration is *irreparable*.” *Sampson v. Murray*, 415 U.S. 61,
23 90-91 (1974). The rights to .Africa cannot be issued again. There is but one
24 holder to the delegation rights to .Africa, and if ZACR is granted those rights after
25 DCA has been improperly denied the fair and transparent gTLD application
26 process ICANN was required to provide, DCA will not be able to obtain those

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¹ *Infra*, Section II.E.

1 rights elsewhere. (See Bekele Decl. ¶2). If ICANN issues the .Africa gTLD
2 delegation rights to ZACR or any other party, DCA will be irreparably harmed.

3 Furthermore, the irreparable harm that DCA will suffer tips the balance in
4 favor of a preliminary injunction, regardless of whether the court finds less weight
5 in DCA’s likelihood of success. “In some cases, we have stated that a plaintiff
6 may meet its burden by demonstrating a combination of probable success on the
7 merits and a possibility of irreparable injury. At other times, we have stated that
8 where the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the plaintiff, the district court
9 need not require a robust showing of likelihood of success on the merits, and may
10 grant preliminary injunctive relief if the plaintiff’s moving papers raise “serious
11 questions” on the merits.” *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige*, 844 F.2d
12 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has demonstrated both a likelihood of success
13 on the merits (based upon the IRP decision granting Plaintiff the relief it seeks
14 here) and inevitable irreparable injury if ICANN is not enjoined from issuing the
15 .Africa gTLD.

16 3. ICANN suffers no injury by having to follow its own
17 rules.

18 ICANN cannot demonstrate any harm, because no harm occurs if the .Africa
19 gTLD is not issued.² “[T]he district court should balance the relative hardships to
20 the parties that would result from granting or denying a preliminary injunction. If
21 the balance tips decidedly toward plaintiffs, and if plaintiffs have raised serious
22 enough questions to require litigation, the injunction **should** issue.” *Aguirre v.*
23 *Chula Vista Sanitary Service & Sani-Tainer, Inc.*, 542 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir.
24 1976) [emphasis added]. As demonstrated above, the lack of harm to ICANN and
25
26

27 ² Since ZACR presently possesses no right to .Africa it will not be materially
28 harmed either. It has also contributed to this delay by its own collusion with AUC
and ICANN to derail DCA’s application and cannot complain of further delay.

1 permanent, irreparable, and irreversible injury - coupled with the likelihood of
2 success - warrants the granting of Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction.

3 4. A preliminary injunction is in the public interest.

4 "The public interest analysis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
5 requires us to consider whether there exists some critical public interest that would
6 be injured by the grant of preliminary relief. *Alliance For The Wild Rockies v.*
7 *Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). The fair and transparent application
8 process that ICANN touts is indisputably in the public interest; in addition to the
9 fact that ICANN regulates the largest public domain in the world (the internet). No
10 public interest would be injured here, but rather it would be preserved and fostered.
11 DCA only seeks to obtain a fair and transparent application processing – the
12 processing it contracted for, was denied as determined by ICANN's IRP, and is
13 entitled to as also determined by ICANN's IRP. Ensuring that the proper party
14 holds the rights to the .Africa gTLD is more important than forcing a process
15 where the gTLD will end up in the hands of an improper party.

16 **B. A preliminary injunction should issue under the alternative test.**

17 DCA has already established probable success on the merits and the
18 inevitable irreparable injury necessary as elements under either test. Under the
19 latter test, the plaintiff must show either "a combination of probable success on the
20 merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised
21 and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor." *Imperial v. Castruita*, 418
22 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 2006) [internal citations omitted].

23 As stated above, DCA seeks declaratory relief with respect to the claim that
24 it is entitled to proceed through the remainder of the .Africa gTLD application
25 process as expressed by the IRP findings. ICANN's IRP accepted DCA's
26 argument and ordered ICANN to do what DCA seeks here. This is an actual
27 controversy, with sufficient immediacy, proper for Court action.

1 In addition to meeting the likelihood of success, the unique character of the
2 .Africa gTLD guarantees irreparable injury will occur if ICANN is allowed to issue
3 the gTLD without first complying with the IRP Declaration and processing DCA’s
4 application at a point beyond the initial evaluation. DCA’s application is rendered
5 meaningless if the .Africa gTLD is issued.

6 Accordingly, under either test, the scale balance in favor of DCA and a
7 preliminary injunction should issue.

8 **C. ICANN’s waiver argument is void.**

9 DCA believes ICANN will assert as its primary defense to this Motion that
10 the Guidebook’s Prospective Release prohibits this Court from ruling on this case.
11 The Prospective Release quoted in Section II.F, *supra*, however, is not enforceable
12 because it violates California Code of Civil Procedure §1668, is unconscionable,
13 and was procured by fraud. ICANN can cite to no authority for the proposition
14 that the Prospective Release is enforceable.³

15 i. A waiver of fraudulent acts and intentional acts is void.

16 ICANN’s Prospective Release is void in that it waives and releases any
17 redress in a court of law, including fraudulent and intentional actions. “All
18 contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from
19 responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of
20 another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of
21 the law.” Cal. Civ. Code §1668; *See also Reudy v. Clear Channel Outdoors, Inc.*,
22 693 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2007) [“a party [cannot] contract away
23

24 ³ In its motion to dismiss, currently on file with this Court, ICANN provides
25 inapposite case law to support its position. The California case law ICANN uses in
26 support of its argument involve settlement agreement mutual releases – not one-
27 sided prospective releases. *See San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego*, 31
28 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1050 (1995); *Winet v. Price*, 4 Cal.App.4th 1159 (1992);
Skrbina v. Flemin Cos., 45 Cal.App.4th 1353 (1996); *Grillo v. California*, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15255 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2006).

1 liability for his fraudulent or intentional acts or for his negligent violations of
2 statutory law, regardless of whether the public interest is affected” (internal
3 citations and quotations omitted).]⁴

4 ICANN’s Prospective Release encompasses every claim that arises from its
5 actions – necessarily including, fraud and intentional violations of law: “Applicant
6 hereby releases ICANN and the ICANN affiliated Parties ... from any and all
7 claims by applicant that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to,
8 any action, or failure to act, by ICANN...in connection with ICANN’s...review of
9 this application, investigation or verification, any characterization or description of
10 this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend, or not to recommend,
11 the approval of applicant’s gTLD application.” *See Baker Pacific Corp. v. Suttles*,
12 220 Cal.App.3d 1148, 1153 (1990) [holding a covenant not to sue that released
13 “for, from and against any and all liability whatsoever” of “any and all claims of
14 every nature” void for excluding fraud, intentional acts, and negligent violations of
15 statutory law.]; Bekele Decl. ¶7 Ex. 3 at Module 6, ¶6. ICANN’s Prospective
16 Release purports to waive fraud and intentional violations of law, and thus, is void.

17 ii. ICANN’s Prospective Release is unconscionable.

18 The Prospective Release is also unenforceable because it is unconscionable.
19 “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
20 have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
21 the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
22 unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
23 clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” Cal. Civ. Code §1670.5(a); *See also*
24 *Nat’l Rural Telcoms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 319 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1054 (C.D.

25 _____
26 ⁴ Although often cited for the claim that public policy must be implicated for a
27 release to be void, *Tunkl v. Regents of California*, 60 Cal.2d 92 (1963) does not
28 support that proposition. *See Reudy v. Clear Channel Outdoors, supra*. Even
under the standard expressed in *Tunkl v. Regents of California, supra*, DCA can
establish that ICANN’s prospective release is void.

1 Cal. 2003). “[T]he test for unconscionability is whether the clauses involved are so
2 one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
3 the making of the contract. [...] To determine unconscionability, courts look to
4 whether the allocation of the burdens and benefits are so one-sided as to shock the
5 conscience or whether there is an ‘absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
6 of the parties together with the contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
7 the other party.’” *Nat’l Rural Telcoms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, supra.

8 “In order to render a contract unenforceable under the doctrine of
9 unconscionability, there must be both a procedural and substantive element of
10 unconscionability. These two elements, however, need not both be present to the
11 same degree.” *Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus.*, 298 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir.
12 2002) [internal citations omitted]. “[C]ourts use a sliding scale, ‘such that the
13 greater the degree of unfair surprise or unequal bargaining power, the less the
14 degrees of substantive unconscionability required to annul the contract and vice
15 versa.’” *Stern v. Cingular Wireless Corp.* (“Stern”) 453 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1146
16 (C.D. Cal. 2006) at 1146. ICANN’s contract is both procedurally and
17 substantively unconscionable.

18 1. The Prospective Release is procedurally unconscionable.

19 All bargaining power was in the hands of ICANN and there was no
20 negotiation. “A contract is procedurally unconscionable if at the time the contract
21 was formed there was ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise.’ Oppression exists if an inequality
22 of bargaining power between the parties results in the absence of real negotiation
23 and meaningful choice. Surprise ‘involves the extent to which the supposedly
24 agreed-upon terms are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking
25 to enforce them.’” *Stern*, supra at 1145; *See also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.*
26 (“*Ingle*”), 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) [“When a party who enjoys greater
27 bargaining power than another party presents the weaker party with a contract
28

1 without a meaningful opportunity to negotiate, ‘oppression and, therefore,
2 procedural unconscionability, are present.’”]

3 DCA had no bargaining power because ICANN holds a monopoly on
4 gTLDs. ICANN is the *only* gTLD provider in the world; .Africa could not be
5 obtained from anyone else. (Bekele Decl. ¶3). In order to apply, DCA was forced
6 to agree to the Guidebook that contained the Prospective Release. (Bekele Decl.
7 ¶8). DCA was not invited to negotiate any provision of the Guidebook nor did
8 DCA contribute the language in the Prospective Release. (Bekele Decl. ¶9). The
9 Guidebook does not encourage the parties to consult with an attorney, nor did
10 DCA do so. (Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3; ¶11). Accordingly, the Prospective Release is
11 procedurally unconscionable.

12 2. The Prospective Release is substantively unconscionable.

13 The Prospective Release is also substantively unconscionable. “A contract
14 is substantively unconscionable if the contract or a provision thereof is overly
15 harsh or one-sided.” *Stern, supra*. “Substantive unconscionability centers on the
16 “terms of the agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to shock the
17 conscience.” *Ingle, supra* at 1172. The Prospective Release is a textbook example
18 of a one-sided agreement. It requires that DCA give up its right to sue ICANN for
19 **any and all** acts relating to the application but does not require ICANN to give up
20 any right to sue DCA. ICANN is not prevented from suing DCA for any violation
21 of law, negligence, fraud or otherwise. The Prospective Release absolves ICANN
22 of all wrongdoing – and provides no benefit to applicants. Because the contract is
23 both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the agreement is
24 unenforceable.

25 iii. ICANN’s Prospective Release was procured by fraud.

26 ICANN’s Prospective Release was procured by fraud and cannot be relied
27 upon to ICANN’s benefit. “Fraud in the inducement is a subset of the tort of fraud
28 whereby ‘the promisor knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by

1 fraud, mutual assent is present and a contract is formed, which by reason of the
2 fraud is voidable.” *Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adt Sec. Servs.* (N.D. Cal. July 9,
3 2009, No. C 08-02035 JW) 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58691, at *7-8. [internal
4 citations omitted]. “Where the plaintiff proves fraudulent inducement (which
5 requires a showing of justifiable reliance), none of [the fraudulently induced
6 agreement’s] provisions have any legal or binding effect.” *Edgewater Place, Inc.*
7 *v. Real Estate Collateral Mgmt. Co. (In Re Edgewater Place, Inc.)*, 1999 U.S. Dist.
8 LEXIS 23692, Case No. ED CV 98-281 RT at *12 (C.D. Cal., May 19, 1999).

9 ICANN required DCA to agree to the terms of its guidebook and pay
10 \$185,000 in order to apply for the .Africa gTLD. DCA agreed only because it was
11 falsely led to believe that the IRP process provided for real redress through the IRP
12 in lieu of court review. (See Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3 at Module 6, ¶6). After the
13 IRP ruled against it, ICANN failed to follow the directives in the IRP ruling,
14 making the above statement false. (See Bekele Decl. ¶7, Ex. 3 at Module 6, ¶6).
15 DCA was provided no redress and would not have agreed to the Guidebook terms
16 or paid the \$185,000 fee, if it knew that ICANN would not follow the IRP
17 decision. ICANN procured the provision by fraud, and it would be inequitable and
18 to DCA’s detriment to find the Prospective Release binding.

19 Accordingly, under any of the grounds stated above, ICANN’s Prospective
20 Release is void and unenforceable.

21 **V. CONCLUSION**

22 For the foregoing reasons, DCA is entitled to the issuance of a preliminary
23 injunction and respectfully requests that this Court grant such.

24 Dated: March 1, 2016

BROWN NERI & SMITH LLP

26 By: /s/ Ethan J. Brown

Ethan J. Brown

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DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST

